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The current issue of Cromohs is entitled ‘From Comparative to Global History’. 
How do you see the relation between comparative history, connected history, and 
global history? Have we somehow gone ‘beyond’ comparison now? 
Let us start with global history, because this is the object of some confusion, as we see 
from the recent book on the subject by Sebastian Conrad, What is Global History? (2016). 
In Conrad’s view, global history is both ‘an object of study and a particular way of looking 
at history’, or what he calls a ‘perspective’. He also tells us that there are three ‘varieties’ 
of global history (which he sometimes calls ‘paradigms’ or ‘models’): one is a ‘history of 
everything’, the second is a study of ‘exchange and connections’, and the third is simply 
an attempt to place narrower cases in something called a ‘global context’. How can 
something be a perspective, an object, a set of paradigms, and a group of models all at 
once? This seems to constitute sloppy thinking and careless use of language; it is not at all 
helpful.  
Rather than such a hopeless muddle, in fact we need to think of global history as 
history on a large geographical scale that transcends the geographical divisions set by 
conventional area studies. And that is it! Now, there are various ways of going about this 
type of history. The time-honored way, certainly going back to Georg Hegel, Karl Marx, 
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comparative history, but I will agree that for historians—like sociologists, anthropologists, 
geographers, and so on—studying variation in space and time remains a key tool.  
Yet when comparative history becomes mechanistic, repetitive, and obvious, or 
when its purpose becomes simply to show how Society A is a failed version of Society B 
(as occurred in connection with a lot of modernization theory), we need to look for other 
methodological approaches (which are, let me stress, neither paradigms nor models). One 
of these is ‘connected history’. Here, our purpose would be to transcend and bypass the 
conventional divisions imposed by the rather arbitrary way in which historians are 
normally trained, so as to redraw geographical boundaries in an innovative way. This does 
not mean we replace one set of rigid boundaries (say, of the nation-state) with another. 
Rather, the geographies have to be as flexible and varied as the problems. The following 
step, which is the really difficult one, is to multiply and read across  archives and other 
primary sources, in keeping with the complexity of the problem. This is why it is easy to 
brandish ‘connected history’ as a slogan, but rather more difficult to execute it in reality. 
These days there is quite a lot of ‘fake’ connected history around, in which historians 
pretend to read materials and archives that they really have not mastered .  
Does this mean we have gone ‘beyond’ comparative history? I don’t think so. 
Rather, I think we must continue to use comparative history, but in a more intelligent and 
careful way than was done in the 1970s and 1980s—when it was all too often just pushing 
through open doors with great fanfare. For example, I have a great interest in the 
comparative history of urbanism, but I really would not wish to return to a view whereby 
the only ‘real’ cities are in the Roman tradition, carried over into Christian Europe, and 
every other case is just a failed or flawed version of such a city. In this case, I am 
particularly interested in second-order comparisons. As such, if one compares the 
trajectories of cities which have been conquered, and where religious dominance has thus 
passed from one group to another, we are not simply comparing morphologies (the classic 
exercise), but processes of transformation accompanied by violence. In this way we have 
a set of commonalities, and can pass on to examine the variations. 
How to do you see the relationship between the particular and the general in 
history, between the use of primary sources and the general synthesis, and between 
micro- and macro-history? 
Even if we are not always looking for laws or models in history, the particular only 
makes sense in relation to the general. (In the US, they sometimes call this the ‘so what’ 
issue: yes, you showed this or that, but ‘so what?’) One uses the particular to build towards 
the general, but also, eventually, to question it. When a general history becomes so distant 
and disconnected from the particular that it is absolutely impervious to contradiction or 
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modification, it has, in my opinion, become pretty useless. This is what happened to 
Immanuel Wallerstein and his theory of  ‘world-systems’ operation (beginning in 1974). 
Historians kept pointing out the hundreds and thousands of small and large factual and 
interpretational errors in his work (I wrote a brief article to this effect in the late 1980s, 
regarding South Asia), but this ‘school’ and its adherents could not have cared less. They 
saw all such errors  as insignificant in relation to their grand model made of Teflon. On 
the other hand, we also have a sort of ‘fuddy-duddy’ version of history, which is only 
concerned with the examination of trivia, and which still survives, especially in some 
European institutions. Often this is a caricature of philology. But I have also come across 
historians, even in the US, who claim to refuse all forms of general categories, and state 
that they are totally uninterested in generalizations. I think this gives history a bad name, 
and allows others to make fun of the discipline as mere self-indulgence. 
As regards the general synthesis as a genre of history-writing, it is certainly necessary, 
but above all as a teaching tool. I have taught now for over three decades, from first year 
college students to advanced seminars in India, Europe, and the US. There is no doubt in 
my mind that one cannot simply get into and engage with primary sources equally at all 
these levels. Even so, it turns out to be quite rare to find a general synthesis that is not 
based on a real engagement with primary materials, and is yet intellectually powerful. When 
I was a student, one such stimulating book—even for someone who was not a Marxist—
was Perry Anderson’s Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974). I rarely read such books for 
intellectual stimulation now. I find that a lot of them, even celebrated ones like the work 
of Jürgen Osterhammel on the nineteenth century, are just turgid compilations, 
accumulating narrative on narrative, or making long lists of this and that, with endless and 
undifferentiated bibliographies that don’t help critical thinking at all. After all, listing and 
analysis are far from being the same exercise. I also don’t trust such works regarding areas 
in which I am not a specialist, because I can see how prone to error they are in my own 
areas of particular competence.  
I have written one book that comes close to a synthesis, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 
(1993, 2nd edition 2012); however, it contains a good number of primary sources, and the 
interpretative framework was also pushing the limits far from the received wisdom. If you 
compare it to the book written by John Russell-Wood at much the same time, World on the 
Move: The Portuguese in Africa, Asia, and America, 1415-1808 (1992) you can see the 
difference. So, even if I were to write a synthesis, I would root it to as far as possible in 
primary and not just secondary sources. 
As for micro- and macro-history, that is a somewhat different albeit related question. 
I follow our common friend and my former colleague Carlo Ginzburg in taking micro-
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whereas in macro-history one often paints with broader brushstrokes, using a more 
aggregative approach. Ginzburg mostly refuses to write any kind of history that is not 
based on a close engagement with primary sources, as I realized when I invited him to 
write a general chapter for The Cambridge World History. Also, he has also never much dealt 
with techniques of aggregation, like statistics, which economic historians inevitably use. 
For my part, I don’t find myself firmly wedded to either viewpoint. Earlier in my career, I 
was more inclined to macro-historical projects than I have come to be. Yet I don’t believe 
strongly that one of these is legitimate and the other is not. It depends on the problems 
and the questions to be addressed. 
What is the role of chance in historical research? 
Anyone who has worked in the archives knows that there is something of chance in the 
work one does. But how much? I think that, like a lot of games of chance, they are really 
games of skill with some element of chance involved. Today, if you give me a problem 
and I am looking for ways to address it, I would hope that I have better skills than I did 
in 1985. Let me give you a few examples. Some years ago, a colleague found an intriguing 
manuscript in a small library in Paris, and was unable to make sense of where exactly it 
came from, or its larger context, even though he could read it. We sat down and read it 
together for half a day. I then suggested that he look in one particular set of archives, and 
he immediately found documents that provided him with quite a lot of direct context. 
After that, he followed the threads into other archives, and eventually did a splendid 
project. Now the reason for this is that I had worked on quite similar things before, and 
he had not; this is like comparing someone in a Las Vegas casino who can count cards 
efficiently with someone who cannot. 
I have also worked in archives which were so chaotic that one never knew if or when 
one would find things. In one case, in Portugal in the 1980s, I only found materials because 
the archivist took a personal liking to me, and decided to show me things that I could 
never have found. The same thing has happened to my wife, who worked on religion in 
rural Brittany, in small and obscure church collections. 
Again, seeing the links between disparate things one has found here and there is 
quite another matter. This can require initial speculative leaps of the imagination, which 
vary a lot from one person to another. A well-known joke in Indian history circles 
concerns a historian who claimed that one of the Mughal emperors would appear in his 
dreams, and direct his researches, even helping him to read obscure documents. Of course 
that is not chance, but the workings of a powerful subconscious instinct. All of us must 
wish we had our own Mughal emperors sometimes. 
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What is the place of the ‘counterfactual’ in the work of a historian? Have you used 
it yourself? Does it permit one to advance new hypotheses? Is this linked to the 
relationship between fiction and history? 
I consider the ‘counterfactual’ to be a somewhat lighthearted and playful, exercise, not to 
be taken very seriously. It therefore surprises me that historians can get into passionate 
arguments about it. Of course, if ever one advances a causal argument, it does mean there 
is an implicit counterfactual in the sense that removing the cause will remove the effect. 
(That does not matter to some of our colleagues, who will proudly tell you that they never 
make causal arguments). I have only engaged in it once, as a result of a conference to 
which Geoffrey Parker invited me at Ohio State University. In the conference, I became 
a bit alarmed because most of the papers seemed to be about assassinations. What if 
Gavrilo Princip had not killed Franz Ferdinand? Or if William III had been killed in 1690 
in the Battle of the Boyne? So I made a Borgesian literary joke of it in my contribution, 
and even invented some nonexistent erudite references to put in the footnotes—but 
Parker’s colleagues were so annoyed by my attitude that they expelled me from the 
conference volume. 
I can’t say I consider an obsession with counterfactuals to be particularly useful 
for historians, or generative of interesting hypotheses. Yes, if there had been no Treaty of 
Versailles, many Germans would have been less resentful in the interwar period. Yet do 
we really want to go into wishful thinking, then, about how there would have been no 
Nazism? On the other hand, I appreciate a certain kind of historical fiction, which plays 
around with this sort of thing. As a child, I loved Alexandre Dumas. But I’ll give you two 
more recent literary examples. One is E. L. Doctorow’s Ragtime (1975), which is set in New 
York in the early twentieth century, and is really a splendid comic exercise. In a very 
different and much darker mode, we have Philip Roth’s The Plot against America (2004). 
Both these novels work for me, but as novels. On the other hand, most of the novels I 
have read that are set in the early modern period do not. Even the best of them, like Orhan 
Pamuk’s My Name is Red (1998), seem based on anachronistic and even dogmatic 
impositions. It is not just me who thinks that; Pamuk consulted a certain number of 
Ottoman historians and art historians, and I have not met one who really liked the book.  
Can you tell us something about your personal history, your training, the choices, 
intellectual influences, and encounters that mark out your itinerary? 
I come from a family that is less of intellectuals than of bureaucrats and civil servants, 
though there were some scientists in the broader family milieu. This is typical of my 
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although I really loved the elegance of mathematics, I had friends who were far more 
talented at maths than I was, and there seemed to be no point in competing with them. 
So I went into economics without much thought, and studied it as an undergraduate for 
three years with not much enthusiasm. I continued to study it at an advanced level in my 
MA, at the Delhi School of Economics, and it was only then that I started to get a proper 
grasp of the subject. I was unfortunate in not having had many good teachers in either 
high school or during undergraduate years, and I envy those who have had that good 
fortune. But at the Delhi School of Economics there was a handful of teachers who were 
also state-of-the-art and world-class researchers (both in economics and social and cultural 
anthropology).  
From economics, I then branched into economic history, which, along with the 
history of economic thought was my favorite part of the subject at that time. This is what 
I did my PhD on between 1982 and 1986, while still based in Delhi. The focus of my 
project was trade history, focusing on the early modern period, and I had to learn a set of 
new languages and skills for it, which I was young and enthusiastic enough to do. The 
choice here was whether to do my PhD in India, or—like most of my contemporaries—
go abroad to Europe or the US. The latter would probably have allowed me to enter more 
smoothly into the usual powerful institutions and networks, like Oxbridge, or the Ivy 
League, or the École normale. We all know the kinds of rewards that people reap from 
having such networks, and their embedded structures of patronage. But I have always been 
rather perverse in my thinking. So I took the harder road, that of the ‘outsider’. Perhaps 
there was some cultural nationalism involved, as well as a sense of excessive pride (which 
is certainly one of my great failings, possibly inherited from my father). To cut a long story 
short, after a lot of painful experiences, I did manage to finish my thesis, which was 
eventually published as The Political Economy of Commerce (1990). During my PhD days, I 
had already begun to teach, and I continued to do so at the Delhi School until 1994-95, 
when I left for Paris, at the encouragement of two senior French historians, Denys 
Lombard and Jean Aubin. 
Among the intellectual influences, there are too many to be mentioned, so I’ll just 
talk about a few of the most direct ones, roughly in chronological order. The first one was 
my thesis advisor, Dharma Kumar, who was an economic historian working mostly on 
South India. She was not very prolific, but wrote one important book on land and caste 
in colonial India, and also edited The Cambridge Economic History of India. From her I learnt 
two things: always to be sceptical of the conventional wisdom, and to push your 
intellectual limits as far as you can, without fear of failing.  
Then, three scholars whom I met in the 1980s: Ashin Das Gupta from Kolkata, Luís 
Filipe Thomaz from Lisbon, and Jean Aubin from Paris. They were all interested in 
commercial and diplomatic history. Each one in his own way helped me to understand 
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how to deal with archives, and various ways of reading them. Of the three, Aubin had the 
greatest chronological range and the broadest set of technical skills, perhaps of any 
historian I have known. He set the bar very high indeed. You could say that each is, or 
was, a sort of ‘positivist’, but at the same time all of them—and especially Das Gupta and 
Aubin—had a very acute sense of the relationship between archival research and the 
production of historical narrative. You can see their influence very markedly in almost 
every book I wrote in the 1990s, with one exception. That exception is Symbols of Substance 
(1992), a book on court culture in South India that I wrote jointly with Velcheru Narayana 
Rao and David Shulman. These two scholars, who are trained to study literature and 
religion, gave my work a strong cultural impetus, which was then carried on in other work 
I did with them. But this first collaboration eventually also influenced another 
collaboration—probably the most long-lasting and productive I have had—with Muzaffar 
Alam, starting around the early 1990s and still ongoing. Working with Alam and Narayana 
Rao also opened totally new doors for me, because both are scholars who are at least partly 
trained outside the western academic system (unlike all the other names I have mentioned). 
Narayana Rao learnt about literature through his family, and by spending time in literary 
circles in small towns in South India, and Alam was trained first in a madrasa in North 
India. I think it is important for us in the university not to denigrate these forms of training, 
especially for literary and humanistic study, but rather to valorize their positive aspects. 
Then, in the last ten or fifteen years, I have been lucky enough to have extended 
conversations and exchanges with a number of other historians, some of whom have been 
my colleagues in Europe or the US. They also include younger colleagues and graduate 
students, who have challenged and encouraged me not to slack off, but rather to keep pace 
with new and emerging research questions.  
In your view, what is the historian’s craft? And what is his/her role in contemporary 
society? 
The interesting thing about history is that, in and of itself, it has a relatively limited set of 
tools, and even its rules are more often like rules of thumb. The primary rule is some 
version of what the Germans liked to call Quellenkritik, from the nineteenth century. But 
there are obviously quite varied notions concerning how one goes about identifying a 
‘source’, and then employing it critically. Even our definition of philology is no longer 
what it was in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the historian’s conception of what can 
and cannot be accepted as a source has tended to shift, or rather to broadly expand and 
become more inclusive, over time. As we know, in the twentieth century, oral history has 
had a substantial influence, which was combined with the multiple and profitable 
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thing is that history is constantly borrowing from other disciplines, some neighboring and 
some far away, and it is here that we have a real set of challenges.  
The first challenge lies in the fact that we may have disciplines that are actually 
epistemologically incompatible. Therefore, combining them promiscuously may only lead 
to deep confusion. For example, there are parts of economics that are based on very hard 
and inflexible conceptions of the ‘primitive’ individual, and individual rationality. Larger 
structures are then derived from such postulates. Yet these postulates may run completely 
counter to what historians think of the functioning of real societies and the people who 
live in them. Such examples can be easily multiplied, and they are a good reason to avoid 
rushing blindly into inter-disciplinary studies regardless of the consequences.  
A second problem is ‘scientism’, namely the genuflection of historians in front of 
what they imagine are the robust results that the hard sciences can give them. Not long 
ago, we had a fashionable wave, during which historians began to read popular versions 
of neurobiology and then make absurd claims, such as that European imperialism could 
be explained as ‘hard-wired’ into popular cultural attitudes. Or again, some historians have 
begun to use DNA testing in quite simplistic ways, when in fact it can only be used with 
an enormous amount of caution and reflection on the relevant categories, and statistical 
methods to be employed. At the other end of the spectrum, historians (especially in the 
US) are regularly tempted by recourse to the writings of philosophical schools which 
espouse extreme relativism, or propositions regarding the indeterminacy of meaning. In 
part, this is because people extract thin slices from the rich diet that philosophers offer 
themselves, and employ them pretty much as they please. Again, it is interesting to observe 
this in the US, where the word ‘theory’ is bandied about in history departments in the 
most cavalier way. All in all, I would say the historian’s toolbox is open, and its contents 
do evolve, but some real control (and self-control) must be exercised so that the contents 
do not become a random collection of instruments. 
Since history is not an applied discipline, the historian—unlike the sociologist or the 
economist—is not primarily a giver of policy advice to the powers-that-be. Oddly enough, 
much of what historians do is show that the conventional wisdom regarding the past is 
doubtful, or plain wrong. This may seem perverse as a way to make a living. Some people 
think that historians should be givers of moral lessons, who are trying to make ‘good 
citizens’. I really cannot subscribe to that view. In my own work, I try frequently to argue 
that it is very difficult to draw straight lines between the past, the present and (therefore) 
the future. In short, at least for me, the historian should be a voice of caution and of 
scepticism, not a cheerleader.  
How important is the place of ideology in your own work? To what extent does the 
present intrude on your questions, and your research? 
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First of all, I don’t adhere to any explicitly named ideology. In India, the far right thinks I 
am a Marxist, while many Marxists are quite dismissive of my kind of history. I don’t 
practice any religion, but I am not hostile to religion either. Of course, I would prefer to 
live in a tolerant and relatively peaceful society, which respects the right to cultural 
difference, rather than a violent one, which seeks to impose homogeneity on its citizens.  
Whatever I may have believed when I was young, I am no longer sympathetic to the 
idea of even revolutionary violence in a ‘progressive’ cause, after seeing the experiences of 
it in the later twentieth century. So, in a loose way, some people would classify me as a 
‘liberal’, though this word is in danger of becoming meaningless. At the same, although I 
am interested in global history, I don’t subscribe to any view on ‘globalization’, or even 
use the concept regularly in my work. However, this cannot mean that my work is either 
the search for the ‘golden age’ in the past, or the bald denunciation of past societies in the 
interests of some future utopia. A good deal of what I study in the past is pretty unsavory, 
but there it is. At any rate, I cannot use the past to run away from the present.  
I would think that if the present intrudes on my research questions, it must be largely 
in an unconscious way. In sum, it has certainly never been my intention to be some sort 
of ‘counsellor to the prince’, and to have Mr Modi, Mr Macron, or Mrs Merkel read my 
work, and thus valorize it. 
How do you see the relationship between violence, religion, and identity-
formation? In relationship to the world in which we live (be it India, Europe, or the 
US), is it correct to speak of the ‘return of religion’? 
This is a subject that I began studying in the mid-1990s. Perhaps I was unconsciously 
influenced by the political climate in India at that time. Whether in regard to South Asia, 
Europe, or the Middle East, it is clear that violence and religion have historically often 
gone hand in hand, because of the need to draw boundaries, to include and exclude, by 
force if need be. Projects of persecution are often at the heart of religious institutions. The 
experience of past persecution can be the justification for persecuting others in the 
present. Some researchers in India claim that all this is a purely modern phenomenon, and 
a product of the nation-state and its activities in the past two hundred years. I don’t see 
how any serious historian can defend that position.  
My main interest here has been in three questions. First, I have tried to show that 
important forms of sectarian violence existed in medieval and early modern India, but that 
they are not exactly what we call ‘communalism’ in India today, because the nature of the 
boundaries between groups is quite different. Further, along with my colleague Muzaffar 
Alam I have tried to show that early modern states such as the Mughals had a particular 
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genealogical relationship with what we call ‘secularism’ in India today, and is different from 
the French notion of laïcité. The second area of enquiry concerns the early modern 
European experience, especially in the Iberian world, but not just limited to it. I find it 
astonishing that the European approach to this question, centring around ideas like 
‘confessionalization’, has been so blithely universalized, as if it were the most natural thing 
in the world. I also find European self-congratulation on this matter more than a little 
troubling. The third question has less to do with my work as a historian, and is more 
relevant to me as an observer of contemporary political life. It concerns the omnipresence 
of religion in the US, where religion permeates nearly all of political life, and a good part 
of social life, too. In Canada, you have turban-wearing Sikhs in politics. In the US, to 
become acceptable, such Sikhs need to call themselves Nikki and Bobby, and convert to 
Methodism or Catholicism. 
So the question of the ‘return of religion’ is quite different in India, western Europe, 
and the US. In the US, religion never went anywhere. It was always there, and God even 
forced the far better motto of ‘E pluribus unum’ to give way. In western Europe, the past 
two or three decades have seen a double return: the religiosity of migrant (often Muslim) 
communities on the one hand, and, on the other, the assertion not so much of religion as 
such, but of the Christian religion as a default social identity. I have no idea whether the 
leaders of the Front national in France are all believing Christians, but they certainly deploy 
that social identity, as do Les Républicains. 
And finally, India is the most complex case. This is because ‘Hinduism’ as a religion 
only crystallized in the nineteenth century, in the face of polemics with Christian 
missionaries on the one hand, and Muslim publicists on the other. Actually, ‘Hinduism’ is 
still a highly unstable category, yet even in its present, unstable, form, it can be employed 
for political mobilization. In the next few decades, the close tie-up between this type of 
community-formation (which I prefer as an idea to identity-formation), religious 
adherence, and actual or potential violence seems sure to remain in place. But I would be 
only too happy to be proven wrong. 
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